Dating dodgeville goatee
Dating dodgeville goatee
Kruger was arrested on an unrelated charge on September 3, but he was evidently released on a signature bond by mistake. If he satisfies those criteria, then we as the reviewing court must consider whether the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” such that it warrants the exercise of our discretion to correct the error. As we noted above, Kruger was assessed one criminal history point for a Wisconsin case in which Kruger was convicted of operating a motor vehicle on September 10, 2013, while under the influence of a controlled substance. Kruger was assessed an additional two points pursuant to Guidelines section 4A1.1(d) because the offense conduct charged in Count Two—the possession of the rifle and ammunition between August 14 and August 28, 2013—occurred while he was still serving a criminal justice sentence (including probation) on a prior conviction. But because that range exceeded the statutory maximum term of 240 months, the statutory maximum became the Guidelines sentencing range. The district court of course imposed a sentence substantially lower than that (180 months); but the point is that its reference point—the advisory Guidelines range — was exactly the same as it would have been if Kruger's criminal history category were II rather than III. 17, 2016) (miscalculation of sentencing range is ordinarily sufficient to establish prejudice for purposes of plain-error review); with United States v. 2014) (any ex post facto error that district court may have committed in relying on more punitive version of Guidelines post-dating defendant's offense to calculate his sentencing range was harmless; “[b]ecause the court was constrained by the statutory maximum under either version of the guidelines, any error in calculating the range for Count I could not have affected the district court's choice of a sentence ․”). For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Kruger's sentence. Hours earlier, Kruger had been spotted driving in the wrong direction on a one-way street in Platteville, Wisconsin.
Kruger told Walter that he also had explosives with him.
As she approached the shed, Kruger pointed a handgun at her. Walter arrived on the scene at that moment from elsewhere on the property driving a truck and cattle trailer and Linda flagged him down.
When Walter exited the truck, Kruger pointed the gun at his own head. (n.1(I)); in Kruger's view, he at most brandished a firearm.
Kruger took Walter on a meandering two-hour journey to Dodgeville, Wisconsin, never stopping in Bloomington.
Twice during the journey, Kruger put a crushed pill into one of the soda cans, lit the pill, and inhaled the smoke, telling Walter that it calmed him.
When Dale pushed the gun away, the two struggled and Kruger grabbed his uncle's neck and began to choke him, repeating the threat to kill him. As any such error did not affect the advisory sentencing range, there is no likelihood that he would have received a different sentence absent the error. The definition concludes with the observation that “although the dangerous weapon does not have to be directly visible, the weapon must be present.” § 1B1.1, comment. In his written challenges to the pre-sentence report, Kruger did offer a “clarification,” noting that the basis for the additional two history points emanated from relevant conduct rather than from the conduct charged in Count II itself. “[T]he Guidelines are to be the sentencing court's ‘starting point and ․ initial benchmark.’ ” Molina-Martinez, supra, 136 S.
Telling Dale that he needed money, Kruger demanded that he open a safe in the basement. 2016); and (3) that the error affects his substantial rights, in the sense that it made a difference to the outcome (in this case, his sentence), Olano, 507 U.
(n.2), and assigned several points to his criminal history. He was born into a broken, dysfunctional family and placed in foster care at the age of 12.
Kruger's father would later tell investigators that Kruger did, in fact, give the gun to him. Application note 1(I) to section 1B1.1 in turn instructs that “otherwise used” in conjunction with a firearm “means that the conduct did not amount to the discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon.” The term “brandished” is in turn defined to “mean[ ] that all or part of the weapon was displayed, or the presence of the weapon was otherwise made known to another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the weapon was directly visible to that person.” § 1B1.1, comment. As we noted above, when Kruger kidnapped Walter Reidl, he took both a shotgun and handgun with him in the truck, placing the handgun in his lap. See Eubanks, 593 F.3d at 651 (defendant pointed gun at specific jewelry store employee and forced employee to ground); Warren, 279 F.3d at 563 (defendant grabbed bank teller by arm, put gun in her back, ordered her into vault room, and told her he did not wish to hurt her); Taylor, 135 F.3d at 483 (defendant poked bank teller in back with gun after he told her to open safe and she hesitated); Hernandez, 106 F.3d at 741 (defendant and his accomplices forcibly kidnapped victim and held him at gunpoint); United States v. 1993) (defendant pointed firearm at faces and heads of bank tellers and customers and ordered them to ground, and was overheard threatening their lives to an accomplice).
Kruger drove to a farm in rural Cassville, Wisconsin, owned by Walter and Linda Reidl.
Linda saw the car arrive on the property and pull into or behind a shed.
Psychiatric problems emerged during his adolescence. As a result of those convictions, during the time period relevant to this case, Kruger could not legally possess a firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce. On June 6, 2013, Kruger arranged to purchase a .22 caliber rifle and a 1,600-round canister of .22 caliber ammunition at a Gander Mountain store in Deforest, Wisconsin.